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Aggregate Signatures with Versatile Randomization and Issuer-Hiding Multi-Authority Anonymous Credentials

  • Omid Mir
  • , Balthazar Bauer
  • , Scott Griffy
  • , Anna Lysyanskaya
  • , Daniel Slamanig
    • IRIF, Université de Paris Cité
    • Brown University

    Publikation: Beitrag in Buch oder Tagungsband › Vortrag mit Beitrag in Tagungsband › Begutachtung

    Abstract

    Anonymous credentials (AC) offer privacy in user-centric identity management. They enable users to authenticate anonymously, revealing only necessary attributes. With the rise of decentralized systems like self-sovereign identity, the demand for efficient AC systems in a decentralized setting has grown. Relying on conventional AC systems, however, require users to present independent credentials when obtaining them from different issuers, leading to increased complexity. AC systems should ideally support being multi-authority for efficient presentation of multiple credentials from various issuers. Another vital property is issuer hiding, ensuring that the issuer's identity remains concealed, revealing only compliance with the verifier's policy. This prevents unique identification based on the sole combination of credential issuers. To date, there exists no AC scheme satisfying both properties simultaneously.
    This paper introduces Issuer-Hiding Multi-Authority Anonymous Credentials (IhMA), utilizing two novel signature primitives: Aggregate Signatures with Randomizable Tags and Public Keys and Aggregate Mercurial Signatures. We provide two constructions of IhMA with different trade-offs based on these primitives and believe that they will have applications beyond IhMA. Besides defining the notations and rigorous security definitions for our primitives, we provide provably secure and efficient constructions, and present benchmarks to showcase practical efficiency.
    OriginalspracheEnglisch
    TitelCCS '23: Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
    ErscheinungsortCopenhagen, Denmark
    Seiten30 - 44
    ISBN (elektronisch)979-8-4007-0050-7
    DOIs
    PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 21 Nov. 2024
    VeranstaltungCCS '23: ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - Copenhagen, Copenhagen , Dänemark
    Dauer: 26 Nov. 2023 → …

    Konferenz

    KonferenzCCS '23: ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
    Land/GebietDänemark
    StadtCopenhagen
    Zeitraum26/11/23 → …

    Research Field

    • Cyber Security

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