Non-Stationarity in Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in Electricity Market Simulation

Charles Renshaw-Whitman, Viktor Zobernig (Speaker), Jochen Cremer, Laurens DE Vries

Research output: Chapter in Book or Conference ProceedingsConference Proceedings with Oral Presentationpeer-review

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Abstract

The design of electricity markets may be facilitated by simulating actors’ behaviors. Recent studies model human decision-makers within markets as agents which learn strategies that maximize expected profits. This work investigates the problem
of ’non-stationarity’ in the context of market simulations, a problem with the learning-algorithms used by such studies which results in agents behaving irrationally, thus limiting the studies’ applicability to real-world strategic behavior.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication23rd Power Systems Computation Conference
Pages1-9
Number of pages9
Publication statusPublished - 4 Jun 2024
Event23rd Power Systems Computation Conference - Paris, France, Paris, France
Duration: 4 Jun 20247 Jun 2024
Conference number: 23
https://pscc2024.fr/

Conference

Conference23rd Power Systems Computation Conference
Abbreviated titlePSCC 2024
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityParis
Period4/06/247/06/24
Internet address

Research Field

  • Flexibility and Business Models

Keywords

  • Deep learning
  • Game theory
  • Market design
  • Market Simulation
  • Reinforcement Learning

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